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*on file
Wright*

18 September 1948

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Since my memorandum of 24 August 1948 on the possibility of early Soviet military aggression there have been additional reports suggesting the imminence of such action. The most notable of them are:

1. That MVD chiefs from Holland, Belgium, France, Italy, and the French, British, and U.S. Zones in Germany, meeting at Brussels on 25 August, were directed to disrupt industrial activity in their respective areas through sabotage, strikes, and disorders, in preparation for "military action in the months to come."
2. That Stalin, on 5 September, issued an order discontinuing Soviet demobilization and directing that personnel in process of demobilization return to their units.
3. That Albanian, Yugoslav, and Bulgarian troops have been concentrated on the Greek frontier.
4. That the Soviets intend to seize Istanbul by force on the night of 18 - 19 September.

Each of those reports may be explained on other grounds than the imminence of aggressive Soviet military operations.

1. The first evidently refers to future, and perhaps hypothetical, Soviet military action. The fact that the strikes and disorders have not yet occurred would indicate that the action referred to is at least not imminent.
2. It has long been anticipated that Soviet demobilization would be discontinued on the completion of its third stage about 1 September. The only disturbing aspect of the report is the reference to the recall of men in process of demobilization. The report is from an unknown source; it is possible that

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- 2 -

The situation abroad was discussed in the Council. In my view, the report in itself is an indication of "prejudicious nature" term of inquiry suggestion.

In Alabamian, Bulgaria, and Hungarian countries on the ground. Guerrillas are supported but they are not on such a scale as to threaten imminent war's aggression. There are indications that the Alabamian dissidents, in particular, are determined in character. The Soviets could not guess their changes without losses before the red and nations if these measures are made to clear or clearing roads, representation.

4. The report of Soviet intervention on Soviet intended tonights from an extremely turbulent and doubtful source. It is unsupported by any evidence of necessary preparations for such an attack, and the probability another 1200 as the war of nerves on purpose.

On general grounds it is considered unlikely that the Soviet Union would resort to overt military aggression in the near future. This does not exclude, however, a resort to force by local elements under Soviet control in any circumstances local circumstances. The Soviet Union might make a provocative solution in Greece by such means at any time that it sees a fair prospect of keeping the conflict localised. It has already stated that Greece is a sphere of peace. It is capable of preventing civil war there. The existing situation would allow to Alabamian, Bulgaria, and Hungary an opportunity and a pretext for intervention in some degree in "self-defense" without the U.S.S.R. itself becoming militarily involved. The Soviet Union would, however, not in the political sphere, and particularly in the Security Council, to prevent efforts to support of the Greek Government, possibly citing as a precedent the non-intervention policy followed during the Spanish Civil War. It must be emphasised however, the U.S.A. would maintain its forces in readiness to cope with any Anglo-American reprisals.

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